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Chapter 8 
Rulemaking* 
PART I. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS 
A. The Rulemaking Process 
1. Statement of Basis and Purpose 
In 1000 Friends of Maryland v. Browner, 1 the D.C. Circuit upheld the 
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) approval of Maryland's State 
Implementation Plan under the Clean Air Act. The battles in this case were 
typically complicated, both legally and technically, and for the most part 
turned on issues specific to the Clean Air Act. However, the court also re-
jected the argument that the agency had failed to provide an adequate state-
ment of basis and purpose. There is, of course, no metric for the level of 
explanatory detail in the statement of basis and purpose; one cannot just say 
that here the court accepted an explanation rating of "7" on the basis-and-
purpose scale. The court offered standard, fairly abstract, and therefore un-
helpful, generalizations about the relative laxity of the basis-and-purpose 
requirement: the statement need not be "exhaustive" nor address every issue 
raised by commenters, it "must simply enable a reviewing court to see what 
major issues of policy were ventilated by the informal proceedings and why 
the agency reacted to them the way it did."2 
Three points might be made. First, the court's overall approach seems 
fairly forgiving. Second, the judgment as to the adequacy of the statement of 
basis and purpose will always be contextual; here part of the context was that 
there had been a grand total of one commenter (namely, the petitioner) on the 
* By Michael Herz, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University (Committee 
Chair) . 
I. 265 F.3d 216 ( 4th Cir. 200 I) (Traxler, J. , joined by Luttig & Thornburgh 
(W.D.N.C.), JJ.). This case is also discussed herein in Environmental and 
Natural Resources Regulation (infra 305-06). 
2. Id. at 238 (quotations and citations omitted). 
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proposed rule. Third, the court explicitly noted that the petitioner's own 
comments on the proposed rule had themselves largely ignored the issue that 
the petitioner now found missing from the statement of basis and purpose. 
Indeed, the EPA had argued that the petitioner had waived its substantive 
argument by failing to make it when commenting on the proposal.3 The court 
concluded that the petitioner had not waived the argument; its comments on 
the proposed rule had at least mentioned the issue a couple of times. How-
ever, when rejecting the petitioner's challenge to the statement of basis and 
purpose, the court stated: 
Although the [agency's] explanations may not have been as detailed 
as the Petitioner would have liked, we nonetheless conclude that 
through these documents the EPA adequately addressed the some-
what general comments of the Petitioner and sufficiently explained 
the basis and purpose of its actions.4 
Thus, the court tied the basis-and-purpose requirement to the notice-and-
comment process: the skimpier and more perfunctory the comments submit-
ted, the more bare-bones an acceptable statement of basis and purpose. 
Implicitly, it adopted a view of notice-and-comment rulemaking more as an 
exchange between the immediate participants, and less as a mechanism for 
informing a larger audience. 
2. "Logical Outgrowth" Requirement 
A final rule must be the "logical outgrowth" of the proposal, otherwise 
interested parties are effectively denied notice and so an opportunity to com-
ment. Cases in which a court finds that the final rule so deviated from the 
proposal as to require a new round of notice and comment are few and far 
between, but the Ninth Circuit recently set aside an EPA rule on this ground.5 
The EPA had issued a "general permit" (in essence a regulation) under 
the Clean Water Act limiting the discharge and accumulation of bark and 
debris from water-based log transfer facilities in Alaska. Piggy-backing on 
Alaska's water quality standards, the proposal would have allowed each facil-
ity to create a "zone of deposit"-an area in which significant accumulations 
3. Id. at 227-28. 
4. Id. at 238. 
5. NRDC v. USEPA, 279 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2002) (Thomas, J., joined by 
Graber & Gould, JJ.). 
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of bark and debris that would otherwise violate state water quality standards 
are permitted-limited to one acre in size. After the comment period, but 
before publication of the final permit, Alaska modified its interpretation of 
its standards, concluding that these operations could have a zone of deposit 
larger than one acre-indeed, as large as the entire operation. The EPA's final 
permit reflected this new understanding by abandoning the one-acre limit. 
While EPA and Alaska communicated with regard to the change, no public 
notice was given about it. 
The Ninth Circuit set aside the final general permit. Changing from a 
one-acre zone of deposit to one the size of the entire operation involved "a 
fundamental policy shift, rather than a natural drafting evolution, between 
the draft permit and the final permit."6 The court's emphasis was on what 
"the public" would reasonably have anticipated to be up for grabs in the 
proceeding. Though the court does not say so in so many words, what gives 
the challengers' claim particular strength here is that the altered provision 
grew out of state law; it therefore reasonably appeared to commenters that 
the provision was not subject to change by the EPA and therefore understand-
ably drew little or no attention from commenters. 
3. Communication and Cooperation between Regulated and 
Regulator 
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel v. 
FCC 1 is an interesting example of the tension between the quasi-on-the-
record model of informal rulemaking that has grown up over the past few 
decades, on the one hand, and the goal of ensuring an informed agency deci-
sion maker, familiar with the setting that it regulates, on the other. To be 
sure, the court seemed unaware of this interesting tension, but the case merits 
a glance nonetheless. 
This case involved a challenge to an FCC order under the much-litigated 
1996 Telecommunications Act. 8 The background is too complicated to sort out 
here; the specific order in question concerned relations, and charges, between 
providers of local telephone service and providers of long-distance service. 
The different providers are normally opponents on issues of telecommunica-
6. Id. at 1188. 
7. 265 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2001) (Garza, J. , joined by Parker & Ellison, JJ.) . 
8. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-04, 110 Stat. 56 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of title 47, United States Code). 
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tions regulation. In this instance, however, they had formed the Coalition for 
Affordable Local and Long Distance Service (CALLS) and worked out a mu-
tually acceptable proposal. The CALLS agreement became, apparently with-
out change, the FCC's proposed order. After notice and comment, the FCC 
made some minor changes to the proposal, conducted a brief second round 
of notice and comment, and promulgated the final order.9 
The order was challenged by consumer interests and, on their behalf, 
by a number of state agencies concerned that it would result in higher 
prices, particularly for rural customers. The court upheld the order almost 
across the board. What makes the case interesting is the petitioners' effort 
to challenge the order on the ground that the fix was in-a group of indus-
try insiders with unique access drew up a proposal, had private meetings to 
ensure that the FCC approved the arrangement, and shut out other interests. 
Thus, the notice-and-comment process was a sham and the agency was 
unduly influenced by the interests it was supposed to regulate. Simply by 
reading the court's opinion, it is difficult to evaluate this characterization. 
It does acquire some surface plausibility, however, from the fact that through-
out the opinion the court refers not to "the FCC Order," or "the challenged 
action," but to "the CALLS Order." 
The petitioners' objections to the process left the court thoroughly un-
moved. Implicitly, the court was endorsing a view of the rulemaking pro-
cess in which "off the record" contacts and cooperation are at least acceptable, 
if not welcome. 
The petitioners made three legal arguments-two standard and one novel. 
First, they argued that there had been improper ex parte contacts between 
the industry coalition and the FCC. Such a claim is an uphill battle in an 
informal rulemaking; it is the rare case in which ex parte contacts so under-
mine the legitimacy of notice-and-comment rulemaking as to compel a 
court to set aside the resulting rule. Here the court endorsed contact be-
tween the agency and the regulated community, stating, without citation, 
that the APA requires only that the agency give notice of any ex parte 
contacts (as it did here). The extent and nature of the contacts is hard to 
determine from Judge Garza's opinion, but that very casualness is itself a 
sign of how little bothered by the contacts the court was. 
The petitioners' second challenge was that the notice-and-comment pro-
9. Although labeled an "order" by the agency, this and similar FCC "orders" 
are for administrative law purposes "rules," and are referred to as "rules" 
and "regulations" in the underlying statute. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(a) (2000). 
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cess had been a sham. To be precise, they challenged the adequacy of the 
second, very brief period for comments on the revised rule, which followed 
a first full round of notice and comment. The court did not consider whether 
the second comment period was adequate. The revised proposal was little 
different from the original; since it was the "logical outgrowth" of that 
proposal, it could have been promulgated as a final rule with no additional 
procedures. Therefore, the further, bonus comment period was immune 
from attack. Even if it had been inadequate in its own right, it still went 
beyond what the agency was required to do, which was nothing. 
The petitioners' most interesting, though equally unsuccessful, argument 
was that the agency's communications with the regulated entities amounted to 
a de facto negotiated rulemaking, triggering the procedural requirements of the 
Negotiated Rulemaking Act (NRA) 10-which, of course, had not been fol-
lowed. The court dismissed the argument quickly on the ground that the NRA's 
requirements are entirely voluntary. By definition, then, there were no require-
ments to trigger. This is a fair reading of the Act, and it is consistent with the 
limited NRA case law. 11 However, the more straightforward and appropriate 
basis for the ruling would have been that the Act itself forbids judicial review 
of "any agency action relating to establishing . . . a negotiated rulemaking 
committee." 12 The petitioners' argument was not only a loser on the merits, it 
could not be made in the first place. 
The larger issue lurking in the case was delegation. The FCC order was 
largely the work of the parties it regulated. To be sure, the FCC was not a 
mere rubber stamp; at least, it was not a mere rubber stamp in any way that 
a court could meaningfully control. There was a full notice-and-comment 
process; the FCC received and evaluated comments; it made changes (though 
minor) to the proposal; and the court did find arbitrary and capricious one 
minor aspect of the order that seemed to be no more than a private compro-
mise unsupported by any independent judgment or evaluation by the agency. 13 
10. 5 u.s.c. §§ 561-570 (2000). 
11. See, e.g., USA Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that assurances made by an agency during the negotiated rulemaking 
process are unenforceable). 
I 2. 5 U.S.C. § 570 (2000). 
13. The order established a "Universal Service Fund" to subsidize poor and rural 
telephone users. The size of the fund was a matter of contention, with differ-
ent studies varying by an order of magnitude as to an appropriate amount. 
The industry coalition picked a number somewhere in the middle; the FCC 
went along. The court was not satisfied that the agency had exercised any 
152 Developments in Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice 
But the order was, in effect, a kind of self-regulation with the FCC's impri-
matur. The advantages and disadvantages of such arrangements are well known; 
in essence one is trading expertise off against rent-seeking. This one case, at 
least, shows a high level of judicial comfort with an agency delegating to 
regulated interests. 
B. Exceptions to Notice-and-Comment Requirements 
"[I]nterpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency 
organization, procedure, or practice" are exempt from the APA's notice-and-
comment requirements. 14 As usual, the past year saw a number cases strug-
gling with these categories. 15 It is not clear whether we are any closer to 
figuring out when an agency pronouncement is a substantive or legislative 
rule, requiring notice and comment, and when it falls within the exceptions. 
But now, at least, combatants have more ammunition. 
independent judgment here and remanded for justification of the number. 
279 F.3d at 327-38. This is the one part of the opinion in which the court is 
concerned that government regulation should reflect more than private 
compromise. 
14. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2000). 
15. And some that did not struggle at all. See, e.g., Edelman v. Lynchburg 
College, 122 S. Ct. 1145, 1150 n.7 (2002) (stating in passing that Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission was not required to follow notice-
and-comment procedures in adopting regulations concerning time limits 
for filing and "verifying" charges of discrimination, even though underly-
ing statute required compliance with the APA, since § 553(b) excepts "rules 
of agency organization, procedure, or practice"); New York State Electric 
and Gas Corp. v. Saranac Power Partners , L.P., 267 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(per curiam) (concluding with little analysis that what FERC described as a 
"general policy" was an interpretive rule, exempt from notice and com-
ment) ; Gunderson v. Hood, 268 F.3d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001) (where 
statute limits eligibility for an early release program to prisoners convicted 
of a "nonviolent" offense, where Bureau of Prison regulation states that a 
felony that "involved the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm or other 
dangerous weapon or explosives" is not a nonviolent offense, and where 
Bureau of Prisons "program statement" further specifies that all offenses 
under a particular section of 18 U.S.C. qualify as such felonies that "in-
volve" such conduct, the program statement is an interpretive rule not 
requiring notice and comment). 
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1. Procedural Rules 
In an interesting decision, Public Citizen v. Department of State, 16 the 
D.C. Circuit held that a Department of State policy with regard to processing 
FOIA applications did not require notice and comment. When answering an 
FOIA request, the Department searched only for documents generated prior 
to the date of the request, as per a published "guidance document" adopted 
without notice and comment. Public Citizen challenged this date-of-request 
cutoff policy on the merits and on the ground that it was not exempt under 
section 553. The district court and the court of appeals both held that it fell 
within the APA exception for procedural rules, though the court of appeals 
went on to set it aside on the merits. Relying on circuit precedent, under 
which the relevant inquiry is not whether a particular requirement "has a 
substantial impact on parties" but rather whether it "encodes a substantive 
value judgment," the court considered the key factor to be that the Department's 
policy applied to all FOIA requests equally. The policy did not reflect a 
"substantive" value judgment, only a desire for the efficient processing of 
FOIA requests. The fact that the rule might have significant consequences-
as a practical matter narrowing the scope of the request and/or the agency's 
obligation to provide records-did not take the rule out of the APA exemp-
tion; procedural rules always have consequences for the rights and obliga-
tions of parties. 
The court treated the issue as straightforward. However, it is not so clear 
that this was a procedural rule; it directly affected what records had to be 
provided in response to an FOIA request. It was thus as "substantive" as a 
regulation going to the scope of any of the FOIA exemptions, or a rule about 
whether old records have to be retrieved from an off-site location; in this 
sense, it was indistinguishable from rules that are undeniably substantive and 
require notice and comment. This case illustrates the difficulty of defining 
the scope of the exception, notwithstanding its apparent simplicity. 
2. Guidance Documents and Policy Statements 
The D.C. Circuit also wrote a new chapter in the long-standing contro-
versy over agencies' reliance on guidance documents, staff manuals, internal 
memos, and the like in place of full-fledged regulations. The standard story 
16. 276 F.3d 634 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Tatel, J., joined by Edwards & Silberman, JJ.). 
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is that the increasing procedural burdens of"informal" rulemaking have forced 
rulemaking underground. Courts can and occasionally do police this ten-
dency by finding that an informal expression of agency policy is a legislative 
rule requiring a full-fledged notice-and-comment rulemaking process. The 
overarching question is how fiercely courts should do so: does reliance on 
policy statements and the like improve efficiency and transparency, provid-
ing the public with useful information that would otherwise be unavailable, 
or does it undermine the APA's procedural protections, allowing the agency 
to make law without input or oversight? 17 
In General Electric Co. v. EPA, 18 the D.C. Circuit found that an agency 
policy statement under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) was a leg-
islative rule. TSCA prohibits the manufacture, processing, distribution, and 
use of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) unless the EPA determines that the 
activity will not result in an "unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment." 19 EPA regulations permit two necessary uses of PCBs: the 
cleanup and disposal of PCB remediation waste and the disposal of PCB 
bulk product waste. 20 The regulations specify particular methods for han-
dling and disposing of these wastes. The regulations also allow for "risk-
based disposal " arrangements; the EPA will approve other disposal 
arrangements if an applicant establishes that the alternative will "not pose 
an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment."2 1 
These regulations were adopted after notice-and-comment proceedings 
and were not challenged. Separately, however, the EPA issued a "PCB Risk 
Assessment Review Guidance Document," which explained what the EPA 
would deem adequate to demonstrate no unreasonable risk. Under the Guid-
ance Document, an applicant could either calculate cancer risks using an 
EPA-approved potency factor, and separately consider non-cancer risks, or 
present a single calculation using the EPA's "total toxicity factor" (TTF)-
a specific level of exposure to PCBs that reflected the EPA's judgment, all 
17. The leading article, which expresses severe skepticism about agency over-
reliance on non-legislative rules, is Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, 
Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like-Should Federal 
Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J . 1311 (1992). 
18. 290 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Ginsburg, J., joined by Randolph & Tatel , 
JJ.). This case is also discussed herein in Environmental and Natural Re-
sources Regulation (infra 313-14). 
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2605(e)(2)-(3) (2000). 
20. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 761.61 (a),(b) , 76 l.62(a),(b) (2002). 
21. Id. , §§ 76l.61(c), 76l.62(c). 
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things considered, of a not-unreasonable risk. The EPA itself had relied on 
this TTF in establishing the generic requirements set out in the actual regu-
lations. The real fight here, it appears, was over this number, which Gneral 
Electric (GE) considered an overestimate of the dangerousness of PCBs. 
GE argued, and the court of appeals agreed, that the Guidance Document 
was a legislative rule; therefore the court had jurisdiction to review it.22 
More important, the rule was invalid because the EPA had, concededly, 
issued it without following the notice-and-comment requirements of the 
APA and TSCA. 
This case is important both because of the blackletter test it sets out and 
for the general attitude it reflects. Over the years, the D.C. Circuit has 
offered different tests for identifying legislative rules .23 In GE v. EPA, the 
panel ignored or rejected many of them. The EPA had invoked Molycorp, 
Inc. v. EPA, 24 which set out three fairly pro-agency factors: "(1) the Agency's 
own characterization of its action; (2) whether the action was published in 
the Federal Register or the Code of Federal Regulations; and (3) whether 
the action has binding effects on private parties or on the agency."25 The GE 
court dismissed the first two factors pretty much without discussion and 
latched on to the third. The petitioner, on the other hand, cited Community 
Nutrition Institute v. Young, 26 in which the court looked to whether the 
agency action "imposes any rights and obligations" or "genuinely leaves 
the agency and its decisionmakers free to exercise discretion."27 The GE 
panel was more sympathetic to this test, but observed, echoing prior panels, 28 
that its two parts largely overlap: an agency statement that binds the agency 
and eliminates its discretion will also impose rights or obligations on private 
parties. Thus, the question came down to whether or not the document was 
22. TSCA provides for direct review of "rules" in the court of appeals. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2618(a)(l)(A) (2000). The EPA had argued that this provision applies 
only to legislative rules; by concluding that the Guidance Document was 
such a rule, the court concluded that it had jurisdiction regardless of whether 
its jurisdiction was so limited. 
23. See generally William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. 
REV . 1321, 1325-31 (2001) . 
24. 197 F.3d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
25 . Id. at 545. 
26 . 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
27. Id. at 948. 
28 . See, e.g., McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988). 
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binding, whether it had "the force of law."29 This is a practical rather than a 
formal inquiry. 
Applying the test, the court found that the Guidance Document was bind-
ing. An applicant had to use one of the two approaches to risk assessment the 
document identified and no other; if the applicant used the EPA's total toxic-
ity factor, the agency was bound to accept it. While the EPA might in the 
future change the TTF in light of new information, that did not make it any 
less binding for the present; after all, any binding norm is subject to future 
change. 
Overall , the opinion shows real hostility to agencies operating outside 
the section 553 process. My own view is that it was probably useful and 
appropriate for the EPA to provide applicants with additional guidance as to 
how the agency would handle applications for non-generic cleanup plans and 
that requiring a full-fledged rulemaking might simply keep that information 
from being produced. Particularly important here is the fact that the TTF 
used in the Guidance Document had been relied on in the legislative rule 
and therefore had been subject to public comment. The EPA's position as to 
the key issue of scientific uncertainty and regulatory policy (a) was not new 
or surprising and (b) had been subject to notice and comment. 30 
3. Interpretive Rules 
Air Transport Ass'n of America v. FAA3 1 involved a fight between airlines 
29 . GE v. EPA, 290 F.3d at 382-83. The court here relies heavily on Professor 
Anthony's article, in particular the following "well-stated" articulation of 
the general standard: a document is a legislative rule, not exempt from 
notice and comment, if it "expresses a change in substantive law or policy 
(that is not an interpretation) which the agency intends to make binding, or 
administers with binding effect." Id. (quoting Anthony, supra note 17 , at 
1355). 
30. The fact that the EPA could have taken exactly the same position reflected 
in the Guidance Document in the course of an informal adjudication, con-
sidering an individual application, is not the key point. If it did so, GE 
would have had the opportunity to contest it. What makes the problem 
hard, and lends support to the court 's approach and its conclusion, is that 
the EPA had already committed itself to a particular position without (on 
the court's account) opportunity for GE's input, either through rulemaking 
or adjudication. 
31. 291 F.3d 49 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Henderson, J., joined by Edwards & Garland, 
JJ .). This case is also discussed herein in Transportation (infra 489-90). 
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and airline pilots over FAA rest requirements. The FAA had taken a pro-pilot 
interpretation of its detailed regulations governing rest periods for commercial 
pilots. The regulations themselves were promulgated pursuant to notice-and-
comrnent rulemaking and appear in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). 
The challenged interpretation was set out in a letter responding to an inquiry 
from an individual pilot. The airlines argued that the interpretation was (a) 
inconsistent with the regulations themselves and (b) a new substantive rule 
requiring notice and comment. The D.C. Circuit rejected both challenges. 
The regulations require pilots to have a certain amount of rest during the 
24-hour period ending with the completion of a flight; this amount can be 
reduced if the pilot will have a certain amount of rest after the flight's comple-
tion and before the next flight. In determining rest requirements, therefore, a 
key factor is the time at which a flight is, or will be, completed ("will be," 
because the necessary amount of rest must often be determined before a flight 
actually takes off). The disagreement here concerned whether what counts is 
the flight's actual or scheduled time of completion. The regulations refer to 
"scheduled flight time"; in the letter, the FAA took the position that this 
means how long the flight is actually expected to take. It reasoned that once 
actual expected flight time is known, that becomes the "schedule"; the air-
lines argued that the regulatory phrase refers to the pre-announced timetable. 
Under the FAA's approach, if a pilot is about to take off on what is supposed 
to be a four-hour flight, which would allow the requisite postflight rest pe-
riod, but traffic and weather conditions indicate that the flight will take six 
hours, which will not allow sufficient postflight rest, the flight cannot leave 
the gate. 
The court upheld the letter on the merits as a reasonable interpretation of 
the agency's own regulation, to which it owed particular deference. Having 
so concluded, it then unsurprisingly found that it was an interpretive rule, not 
requiring notice and comment.32 The opinion looked to familiar factors: the 
32. The case illustrates how deference on the merits may undercut judicial en-
forcement of procedural requirements. One strong tradition in administrative 
law is that courts are not really in a position to second-guess agencies sub-
stantively, but can and should be rigorous with regard to procedural require-
ments. Here, the two are not so easily separated. The court first asks whether 
this understandable but somewhat questionable "interpretation" can be up-
held on the merits. Noting the need for super-strong deference to an agency's 
interpretation of its own regulations, it finds the letter a permissible reading. 
That conclusion makes the answer to the procedural question a foregone 
conclusion. If the letter is an acceptable reading of the regulations, then by 
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letter "spell[ed] out a duty fairly encompassed within the regulation that the 
interpretation purport[ed] to construe"; even absent the letter there would 
have been a sufficient basis to enforce the requirements it specified; it did not 
impose new rights or duties; it was not published in the CFR; and the FAA 
did not invoke its general rulemaking authority.33 The opinion is not flatly 
inconsistent with GE v. EPA, but there is at least some tension between the 
two. Certainly, this panel was more relaxed about agency guidance outside of 
section 553 rulemaking. 
In the final section of the opinion, the court considered the petitioners' 
argument that even if this was an interpretation, it was a new one, reflecting 
a change from the FAA's long-standing understanding of the regulations. The 
petitioners invoked the Alaska Professional Hunters'34 principle that a signifi-
cant change to a settled interpretation is a de facto modification of the under-
lying rule and requires notice and comment.Although the question was perhaps 
closer than the court was willing to acknowledge, here it found no firmly 
settled, or definitive, prior interpretation with which the letter conflicted and 
accordingly no change that would trigger notice-and-comment requirements. 35 
definition it is an interpretive rather than a substantive rule, and so notice 
and comment is not required; the court could not have ruled otherwise. For 
a complete merger of the substantive and procedural questions in such a 
setting, see Gunderson v. Hood, 268 F.3d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001) ("We 
hold that because the program statement is not inconsistent with the regu-
lation, it is a valid interpretive rule."). For an example of a court rejecting 
an agency interpretation of its own regulations, and therefore concluding 
that the new interpretation amounted to a new rule requiring notice and 
comment, see Torch Operating Co. v. Babbitt, 172 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 
200 I) (Sullivan, J.) . 
33. These last two factors are two of the four indicia of a substantive rule set out 
in American Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 
1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The court deemed them "inapplicable" here, by 
which it meant that they point to the letter being an interpretive rather than 
a substantive rule. 291 F.3d at 56 n.9. The D.C. Circuit has held in other 
post-American Mining Congress cases that whether a rule is published in 
the CFR is not indicative of whether it is a substantive rule. See Health Ins. 
Ass'n of Am. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that 
publication in the CFR affords at most "a snippet of evidence of agency 
intent") . 
34. Alaska Professional Hunters Ass'n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 
1999). 
35. In another case, the D.C. Circuit similarly skirted the Alaska Professional 
Hunters problem by finding a new definitive prior interpretation. See Darrell 
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National Mining Ass'n v. Department of Labor36 involved a sweeping 
challenge to regulations governing administration of the Black Lung Benefits 
Act. Under the Act, mine operators are financially responsible for paying out 
claims ( and must obtain insurance for the purpose of doing so) to their former 
employees who are disabled by black lung disease; the Department of Labor's 
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs oversees the Act and adjudicates 
individual applications for benefits. In December 2000, the Secretary of La-
bor promulgated extensive revisions to the regulations governing adjudica-
tion of individual claims. Overall, the changes were seen as pro-applicant; 
mine operators expected significant increases in their insurance rates as a 
result of the changes. 37 
Mine operators, insurance companies, and the National Mining Associa-
tion challenged the new regulations in the federal District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, which upheld them across the board.38 In a per curiam 
opinion, the court of appeals largely agreed with the district court, but set 
aside certain aspects of the regulations.39 For present purposes, the important 
part of the ruling is its discussion of retroactivity. 
The plaintiffs challenged 14 specific provisions in the new regulations as 
impermissibly retroactive, and the court duly considered them one by one. I 
will not repeat the specific discussion here. Several general aspects of its 
approach and rulings are important, however. 
First, the court began with the standard premise that retroactive 
rulemaking, while not per se impermissible, requires explicit congressional 
authorization. Such authorization was lacking here; therefore, any retroac-
tive provision was invalid. Second, it accepted application of the new regula-
Andrews Trucking, Inc. v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Admin. , 296 F.3d 
1120, 1125-30 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
36. 292 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (Edwards, Tatel & Silberman, JJ.). 
37 . For an extensive critique of the Black Lung Program, with reference to the 
potential ameliorative effect of these new rules , see generally Brian C. 
Murchison, Due Process, Black Lung, and the Shaping of Administrative 
Justice, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1025 (2002). 
38. National Mining Ass'n v. Chao, 160 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D.D.C. 2001). 
39. National Mining Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 292 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 
2002). 
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tions to all claims for benefits that were filed on or after the regulations ' 
effective date. That is, as long as a claim was filed with the regulations in 
effect, then the regulations were, by definition, not retroactive.40 Third, the 
court rejected a simple distinction between procedural and substantive rules. 
The easiest way out of the case, offered by the Secretary and relied on by the 
district court, would have been to say that the regulations were all proce-
dural , only covered adjudications yet to occur, and were not retroactive even 
as applied to claims that were already pending, though not yet adjudicated. 
The court of appeals cautioned, however, that "procedural" rules can be im-
permissibly retroactive. Its stated test was: "where a rule 'changes the law in 
a way that adversely affects [a party's) prospects for success on the merits of 
the claim,' it may operate retroactively [and thus be invalid] even if desig-
nated 'procedural ' by the Secretary."41 
Applying this standard, the court held that several new rules could not be 
applied to claims that were already pending when the regulations were pro-
mulgated, at least in circuits in which judicial precedent had been to the 
contrary.42 The impermissibly retroactive provisions included a new rule that 
benefits would not be reduced by recoveries under state workers' compensa-
40. This cutoff point, though accepted by the parties, is not obviously correct. 
The underlying concerns about retroactivity go to rules and incentives 
affecting primary conduct; a new rule is problematic if it changes the con-
sequences or legality of conduct that has already occurred, because the 
regulated party cannot act in light of what turns out to be the applicable 
rule. When a claim is filed has nothing to do with these concerns. The court 
could have ruled that the new rules could not be applied to claims that 
arose (i.e. in which the relevant conduct had occurred) before promulga-
tion of the regulations, not just those that had been filed before that date. 
Such a ruling would have been far more significant. Thus, the court's rela-
tive firmness with regard to what counts as retroactive was diluted by its 
relative softness with regard to the cutoff date. 
4 l. National Mining Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 292 F.3d at 860 (quoting 
Ibrahim v. District of Columbia, 208 F.3d l032, l036 (D.C. Cir. 2000)) (fi rst 
parenthetical in original). 
42 . Many of the specifics in the regulations resolved questions of law on which 
courts of appeals had di sagreed. This phenomenon is itself an interesting 
example of the role of rulemaking in the modern era. This situation could 
be exhibit A for Peter Strauss's argument that one important justification 
for judicial deference to agency interpretations is that it promotes unifor-
mity in federal law. See Peter Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: 
Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial 
Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. l093 , 1121-22 (1987). 
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tion laws, a change in the definition of the basic condition for which benefits 
may be received, and an expansion of the list of dependents and relatives who 
can receive benefits. In fact, one would think that such retroactive changes 
would have been set aside even under the procedural/substantive distinction 
rejected by the court, for they are not really "procedural" by any definition. 
To the extent they change the previous rule, they modify the amount and 
scope of liability, doing much more than merely increasing the chances that 
one party or the other will be able to prove its case under legal principles that 
have not changed. 
A second instance of judicial hostility to retroactive rulemaking was Si-
erra Club v. Whitman. 43 There a citizens' group found itself in the unusual 
position of asking the court to compel an agency to make a rule (a nonattainment 
designation under the Clean Air Act) retroactive. The district court refused 
and the court of appeals affirmed, with no sympathy toward the plaintiff's 
argument. The appeals court adopted Justice Scalia's position that the APA 
forbids retroactive rulemaking,44 found no authority for such rules in the 
Clean Air Act, and opined that even if such authority could be found, a 
retroactive nonattainment designation would be "far from reasonable" in light 
of its attendant compliance costs and, potentially, noncompliance penalties.45 
2. What Is a Rule? 
In Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida v. Veneman,46 the D.C. 
Circuit rejected the Department of Agriculture's claim that its actions were not 
covered by section 553 because they did not amount to a "rule" at all. The case 
concerned a government support program for sugar growers and arose out of 
competitive struggles between cane sugar growers and beet sugar growers, 
against the background of government programs that had produced a massive 
oversupply of warehoused sugar. Pursuant to statutory authority, in 2000 the 
Department conducted a payment-in-kind program through which growers could 
43. 285 F.3d 63 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Randolph, J., joined by Henderson & Rogers, 
JJ.). This case is also discussed herein in Environmental and Natural Re-
sources Regulation (infra 315). 
44. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 216-23 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
45. Sierra Club, 285 F.3d at 68. 
46. 289 F.3d 89 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Silberman, J., joined by Tatel & Garland, JJ.). 
This case is also discussed herein in Agriculture (infra 190-92). 
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destroy their crops in return for receiving surplus sugar the government had 
stored. After an informal discussion with interested parties, it decided to repeat 
the program in 2001. The Department issued a press release and published in 
the Federal Register a "Notice of Program Implementation" that set out the 
details of the program. Among other things, the notice stated that farmers who 
increased their production acreage above existing levels would be excluded 
from the program in future years. 
The court of appeals concluded that establishment of the program was a 
" rule" and accordingly had to be issued through notice and comment. The 
agency had sought to portray the press release and notice as a one-time ac-
tion, essentially an informal adjudication. The court did not buy the argu-
ment and stated: 
The August 31 press release, the September Questions and Answers 
and most notably the September 7 Notice of Program Implementa-
tion set forth the bid submission procedures which all applicants 
must follow, the payment limitations of the program, and the sanc-
tions that will be imposed on participants if they plant more in future 
years than in 200 I. It is simply absurd to call this anything but a rule 
"by any other name."47 
The decision may well be correct, but the court's brief discussion does 
not demonstrate why. The real question is: how ministerial was the decision to 
implement the program and the specification of its details? Not every "Notice 
of Program Implementation" is a rule. If a statute dictates that the program 
occur and sets out its details, and the agency is simply implementing that con-
gressional decision, an announcement that the program is under way or an 
advertisement of its existence should not be deemed a rule. Implicit in the 
court's decision in Sugar Cane Growers, then, is a silent interpretation of the 
statute. Also implicit is real dubiousness about the avoidance of section 553.48 
47 . Id. at 96. 
48 . The court briefly explained why section 553 procedures are so important. 
Displaying some judicial hubris, it identified "perhaps the most important" 
feature of the process as not the chance for affected parties to be heard or the 
agency to be informed, but the fact that the process produces a statement of 
basis and purpose, "which needs to take account of the major comments-
and often is a major focus of judicial review." Id. at 96-97. 
Chapter 8: Rulemaking 163 
3. Choosing between Rulemaking and Adjudication 
One unusual decision on the "what is a rule" question merits brief men-
tion. United States v. Roberts49 involved a criminal prosecution for conspiracy 
to distribute a controlled substance. The particular substance at issue was not 
actually listed on the schedule of controlled substances. However, by statute 
the drug laws apply equally to so-called "analogues" of scheduled substances. 50 
The defendants argued that the drug they had possessed was not sufficiently 
similar to a listed substance to sustain the prosecution. This included a proce-
dural argument under section 553. The assertion was that the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration's determination that the two substances were analogous 
was a legislative rule requiring notice and comment. The court rejected the 
argument. The DEA had not engaged in a rulemaking; and if notice-and-
comment rulemaking were necessary to identify each "analogous" drug, then 
the whole statute would be pointless. The court's conclusion is clearly cor-
rect, but its reasoning is somewhat conclusory and beside the point. From the 
administrative lawyer's perspective, this is really a case about the choice 
between adjudication and rulemaking. It would be entirely appropriate for an 
agency to develop a list of analogous substances by rule (assuming that the 
statute gives it rulemaking authority). But it could also pursue the adjudica-
tory avenue. That the adjudication here was a criminal prosecution raises 
potential notice concerns sounding in due process51 but does not change the 
fundamental point that law can be made through adjudication. 
Finally, although the U.S. Supreme Court was quite silent with regard to 
rulemaking during the 2001 term, one case bears mention precisely because it 
was not about rulemaking. In Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina 
State Ports Authority,52 the Court continued its expansion of the states' Elev-
enth Amendment immunity by holding that a federal agency, like a federal 
court, cannot adjudicate a claim by a private party against a non-consenting 
state.53 The agency itself can pursue administrative enforcement against the 
49. 2001 WL 1646732 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2001) (Sweet, J.) . 
50. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(32)(A), 813 (2000). 
51 . Such problems can also arise when there has been a rulemaking. See, e.g., 
United States v. Ward, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15897 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (Surrick, 
J.) (dismissing indictment because OSHA regulation alleged to have been 
violated was unconstitutionally vague). 
52. 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002) (Thomas, J.) (5-4). 
53. This case is also discussed herein in Adjudication (supra 8-11) and Consti-
tutional Law and Separation of Powers (supra 23-29). 
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state, but private parties cannot. The decision does not mean that states are 
beyond the federal government's regulatory authority, only that one particu-
lar avenue of enforcement is foreclosed. The consequences of this decision 
are hard to predict; indeed, the Justices and the parties disagreed about them. 54 
Had it been decided 50 years ago, one would predict that it would lead agen-
cies to turn from adjudication to rulemaking. However, there has already 
been such a tum, and the adjudications now foreclosed by the decision gener-
ally would have involved enforcement of regulations, not the articulation of 
legal requirements. Perhaps at the margin, however, this decision is one more 
impetus for agencies to move away from adjudication and toward rulemaking. 
4. Tying the Agency's Hands Through Settlement 
A 1986 Department of Justice policy statement ("Meese memo") prohib-
its an agency from entering a consent decree "that divests a [government 
official] of discretion" or "that converts into a mandatory duty the otherwise 
discretionary authority [of an official] to revise, amend, or promulgate regu-
lations."55 The legal necessity of this policy is challenged in a 1999 Office of 
Legal Counsel memorandum.56 Although the Meese memo was controversial 
when it was issued, the interplay of settlements and rulemaking authority has 
been remarkably uncontroversial in the intervening 15 years. However, one 
very recent case raises this issue; it is important in itself and may augur 
greater disputes to come. 
In January 2000, a group of environmental organizations sued the Fish 
and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the Army Corps of Engineers under the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), the National Environmental Pro-
54. 122 S. Ct. at I 878-79. 
55. Memorandum from Edwin Meese III, Attorney General, to All Assistant 
Attorneys General and All U.S. Attorneys 3, 4 (Mar. 13, 1986). The memo is 
discussed in Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Attorney General's Policy on Con-
sent Decrees and Settlement Agreements, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 101 (1987). See 
also 28 C.F.R. § 0.160(c)(4) (2002) (requiring assistant attorneys general to 
refer to the deputy attorney general or the associate attorney general a 
"proposed settlement [that] converts into a mandatory duty the otherwise 
discretionary authority of a department or agency to promulgate, revise, or 
rescind regulations"). 
56 . Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of Legal Counsel, to Raymond C. Fisher, Associate Attorney General 
(June 15, 1999), available at http://www. usdoj .gov/olc/consent_ 
decrees2.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2002). 
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tectionAct, and the Endangered Species Act challenging the agencies' failure 
to adequately protect the endangered Florida manatee.57 Various industry or-
ganizations intervened as defendants, and the parties ultimately reached a 
settlement in January 200 I. The district court approved the agreement on 
January 5, 2001, and filed it as an order of the court on January 17, 2001, 
three days before Bill Clinton left office. 
The settlement had two basic provisions. First, FWS was to commence a 
rulemaking concerning the "incidental taking" of manatees under the MMPA; 
the Corps agreed to "cooperate" in that effort. The agreement was carefully 
worded not to oblige the Service to produce a regulation with particular 
requirements, or any regulation at all.58 Second, the agreement required the 
FWS to propose by April 2001, and promulgate in final form by September 
200 I, new manatee refuges and sanctuaries "throughout peninsular Florida."59 
Implementation of the agreement seems to have proceeded slowly, and the 
deadlines were renegotiated twice. The focus of controversy was the estab-
lishment of refuges and sanctuaries. Early in 2002, FWS published a final 
rule identifying 16 possible refuges and sanctuaries; however, it only actually 
designated two refuges and no sanctuaries, stating that it was delaying any 
action on the other 14 until December 2002. The plaintiffs returned to the 
district court, which ruled in July 2002 that the defendants were in violation 
of the settlement agreement, which the court interpreted to require FWS to 
establish multiple refuges and sanctuaries over a wide area. The court or-
dered briefing on the question of remedy. 
Now it gets interesting. The Justice Department attorneys representing 
FWS argued that the underlying agreement was invalid. If the agreement 
really committed the Service to a particular rulemaking outcome-numerous 
protective areas throughout the state-it violated the APA. Such a foregone, 
indeed legally mandated, outcome would make the notice-and-comment pro-
cess a sham. All an agency can do in a settlement agreement is to promise to 
propose new regulations and take public comment on them. But it cannot 
commit to a particular outcome. The district court judge could not have been 
less moved by this argument. Rejecting it out of hand as self-evidently meritless, 
57 . Save the Manatee Club v. Ballard, Civ. No. 00-76 (D.D.C.) (Sullivan, J.). 
58. "The parties agree that this MMPA incidental take rulemaking proceeding 
will result in a proposed regulation and, if the requirements set forth in 
section 10l(a)(5) of the MMPA are deemed by the Service to be satisfied, a 
final MMPA incidental take regulation." Settlement Agreement at 'I 1. 
59. Id. at'l[ 11. 
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he ordered FWS to issue final regulations by November 1 and scheduled 
briefing and a hearing on the question whether to hold the Secretary of the 
Interior in contempt for failing to carry out the agreement.6() 
The ruling may be correct, and the struggle in this case is wrapped up in 
political considerations, but the legal issue here is much more substantial than 
it seemed to the district court. Rulemaking settlements do have the potential 
to conflict with substantive requirements or short-circuit procedural ones.61 It 
may be that the filing in the manatee case signals an increased DOJ vigilance 
about these concerns, hearkening back to, but not identical to, the Meese 
memorandum. 62 
PART II. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
The past year saw enactment of no significant piece of federal legislation 
affecting rulemaking. Congress did give meaningful attention to two areas that, 
while broader than rulemaking per se, have important applications to it: regu-
latory burdens on small business and the continued growth of e-government. 
A. Small Business 
Among the many proposed and several enacted measures to benefit small 
business during the past year was yet another Paperwork Act. This one, the 
Small Business Paperwork Relief Act,63 (1) requires the Office of Manage-
60. Save the Manatee Club v. Ballard, 215 F. Supp. 2d 88 (D.D.C. 2002). 
61 . For an illuminating general di scussion of the problems posed by rulemaking 
settlements, see Jim Rossi , Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative 
Procedure: The Public Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DuKE L.J. 
1015 (2001). Rossi's particular concern is that the public interest and sub-
sequent administration 's prerogatives may get short shrift when courts en-
force essentially private bargains between an agency and one interested 
party concerning the scope, content, or timing of rulemaking. 
62. Indeed, the specific legal argument made by DOJ has its basis not in the 
1986 Meese memorandum, but in the 1999 Clinton OLC memorandum, 
which stated: "We emphasize that the Administrative Procedure Act gener-
ally limits the manner by which executive branch agencies may adopt, 
amend, or revise regulatory rules and procedures, and thus that it will be 
important to ensure that the terms of any settlement limiting the otherwise 
discretionary regulatory authority of an executive branch agency conform 
to the terms of that Act." Moss memorandum, supra note 56 at 4. 
63 . Pub. L. No. 107-f98,· 116 Stat. 729 (June 28, 2002). 
' ' 
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ment and Budget to publish an annual list of compliance assistance resources 
available to small businesses; (2) requires each agency to establish a single 
liaison for small businesses and to further reduce paperwork requirements for 
businesses with fewer than 25 employees; (3) establishes an interagency 
taskforce to recommend improvements in information collection and dis-
semination; and (4) requires agencies to report statistics to Congress and the 
Small Business and Agricultural Regulatory Ombudsman tabulating enforce-
ment actions against small businesses and the reductions in penalties afforded 
to them. 
Early in the 107th Congress the Senate passed S. 395, the Independent 
Office of Advocacy Act, which would make mild changes aimed at increas-
ing the strength and independence of the Small Business Administration's 
Office of Advocacy (Advocacy).64 The 107th Congress's second session saw 
continued efforts to strengthen Advocacy's influence in the regulatory pro-
cess. On May 21, 2002, the House unanimously passed H.R. 4231, The Small 
Business Advocacy Improvement Act of 2002. The bill's findings assert that 
"[e]xcessive regulations continue to burden the Nation's small businesses" 
and that "[f]ederal agencies continue to propose regulations that impose dis-
proportionate burdens on small businesses."65 The legislation would increase 
the rank, staffing, and budget of the Office and make its funding a specific 
line item in the federal budget; however, it would not make meaningful sub-
stantive changes to its authority or statutory duties. As of this writing, a 
conference has yet to be scheduled and seems unlikely to occur. The next 
Congress may well see legislation along these lines finally enacted. 
B. E-Government 
Surely the most significant recent change to the rulemaking process has 
been the increased use of the Internet. Much has already happened without 
any congressional oversight or imprimatur. (Indeed, for many cyberspace 
enthusiasts that is exactly the point; Congress can only mess up a system that 
works best as the sum of the untrammeled creativity and initiative of its 
participants.) Of course, the increased use of the World Wide Web by state 
and federal agencies is not limited to rulemaking. However, rulemaking is 
64. See DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE 2000-2001 
(Jeffrey S. Lubbers, ed.) at 135. 
65 . H.R. 4231 , 107th Cong. § 2(a)(l), (2) (2001). 
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one prominent instance of it. E-Rulemaking is discussed further in Part III of 
this chapter, but one legislative proposal merits mention here. 
On June 27, 2002, the Senate passed S. 803, The £-Government Act of 
2002. Introduced by Senator Lieberman (D-CT), the bill would create a new 
Office of Electronic Government, headed by a Senate-approved administra-
tor, within 0MB and require or encourage government use of the Internet in 
a wide variety of settings. Section 206 of the bill applies to regulatory agen-
cies. As passed by the Senate, it would impose two basic requirements. The 
first is really an amendment or extension of EFOIA: agencies would be re-
quired to establish a Web site with information about the agency and post to 
the Web site all information required to be published in the Federal Register 
under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l). 66 The second requirement goes directly to 
rulemaking: each agency would be required to accept comments on proposed 
rules submitted by electronic means67 and to maintain an electronic docket 
for all section 553 rulemakings.68 The docket would include all public com-
ments as well as "other materials that by agency rule or practice are included 
in the rulemaking docket under section 553(c)."69 
These provisions do not add up to all that much. First, each substantive 
requirement is qualified by an introductory "to the extent practicable," and 
the requirement of posting public comments gets its own additional (and 
redundant) "to the extent practicable." Second, there is no statutory timetable 
for implementation, although 0MB is supposed to establish one. Third, ac-
tual agency activity has already largely outstripped what the bill envisions, as 
discussed below.70 In short, at least with regard to rulemaking, S. 803 seems 
a classic example of Congress leading from the rear. It responds to important 
66. As introduced, section 206 of the bill went further, requiring the Web site 
also to include all information that must be made available for inspection 
and copying under sections 552(a)(2) and (a)(5). Although this would have 
applied only to information generated after the effective date of the Act, it 
was apparently deemed too burdensome. 
67. S. 803, 107th Cong. § 206(c) (2002) ("electronic means" includes both e-
mail and fax). 
68. Id. § 206(d)(I). 
69 . Id. § 206(d)(2). It is a sign of how the practice of informal rulemaking has 
changed since the APA was adopted that the bill refers to something that 
does not actually exist under the statute, using a reference that administra-
tive lawyers of a generation ago would not have recognized, viz., a 553(c) 
rulemaking docket. 
70. See infra notes 94-102 and accompanying text. 
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developments and looks impressive. But it would accomplish little and re-
quire less than what many agencies are already doing. This may be a com-
pletely appropriate role for Congress in this setting, and the ineffectualness 
of the legislation could be described as one of its strengths. 
PART III. ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Presidential and 0MB Oversight of the Rulemaking Process 
This has been an interesting year with regard to centralized review of 
federal agency rulemaking. 
1. E.O. 12,866 
The first interesting thing that happened was that something did not hap-
pen: the Bush Administration left the Clinton regulatory review Executive 
Order 12,86671 essentially intact. Many expected that, if only for political 
reasons, President Bush would amend the Clinton Order. With minor excep-
tions discussed below, he did not do so. To be sure, there was little or no 
substantive reason for him to do so; from the Republican Party's point of 
view, the shortcomings of the Clinton Order were primarily in its implemen-
tation, not in its text. Nonetheless, the fact that the current administration did 
not feel the need to put its own stamp on the process and issue its own Execu-
tive Order is important, for it suggests that centralized 0MB review has 
reached a certain maturity and stability. 
This is not to say that 0MB review in the current administration is iden-
tical to 0MB review in the previous administration. The change in personnel 
and in their mandate from the White House guaranteed the contrary. In Sep-
tember 2001, the administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA), John Graham, issued a widely distributed memorandum to 
the President's Management Council72 in which he indicated his determina-
71. Executive Order 12,866, Regulatory Planning and Review (Sept. 30, 1993); 
58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct 4. 1993). 
72 . President Bush established the President's Management Council in July 2001. 
Chaired by the Deputy Director of 0MB, it consists of the Chief Operating 
Officer (essentially, the number two) from each cabinet department, EPA, 
FEMA, NASA, the National Science Foundation, the Social Security Admin-
istration, the heads of OPM and the GSA, and a handful of others. See Memo 
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tion to "implement vigorously the principles and procedures" of E.O. 12,866. 
He apparently has done just that. From 1993 to 1999, OIRA returned an 
average of two rules per year to agencies; none were returned during the last 
three years of the Clinton Administration.73 Between July 2001 and March 
2002, OIRA returned 20 proposed regulations to agencies, more than during 
the entire Clinton Administration.74 
Not only has the substance of OIRA review become more searching, 
the process has changed in one significant respect. The Executive Order 
anticipates that OIRA will "notify the agency in writing of the results of its 
review."75 If and when the agency takes final action, OIRA "shall make 
available to the public all documents exchanged between OIRA and the 
agency during the review by OIRA."76 In practice, however, discussions 
between OIRA and agencies have not always left a paper trail. Historically, 
OIRA has sometimes written a "return letter" when it found a proposed 
regulation, or its accompanying analysis, wanting. But these were not al-
ways made public, and more often, particularly in recent years, OIRA has 
expressed its reservations orally and informally. In the current regime, OIRA 
has written, and posted to its Web site, a formal explanation-a return 
letter-when it has sent back a proposal for reconsideration by the agency. 
John Graham views this practice as an important step in ensuring a "trans-
parent" process,77 and others have endorsed it. 78 At the same time, the pro-
randum from George W. Bush to Heads of Executive Departments and Agen-
cies Re Implementing Government Reform (July 11 , 200 I) (requiring agen-
cies to designate chief operating officers, creating the Council, and revoking 
the Clinton administration's equivalent memorandum, entitled "Implement-
ing Management Reform in the Executive Branch"). 
73. James L. Gattuso, Regulating the Regulators: 0/RA 's Comeback, in HERI-
TAGE FouND. ExEc. MEMO. No. 813 at 2 (May 9, 2002). 
74 . Id. See also Regulatory Accounting: Costs and Benefits of Federal Regula-
tions, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Natural Resources 
& Regulatory Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Reform, 107th 
Cong. (Mar. 12, 2002) (statement of John D. Graham, Administrator of OIRA) 
(reporting "over twenty" returns from July 200 I to March 2002) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Graham Testimony] . 
75. E.O. 12,866, § 6(b)(2). 
76. Id. § 6(b)(4)(C). 
77. See Memorandum from John D. Graham to OIRA Staff Re OIRA Disclosure 
(Oct. 18, 2001). 
78 . Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving 
Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. 
Chapter 8: Rulemaking 171 
duction and publication of return letters-and, in some cases, "post-return 
letters," critiquing final agency action-has made some agency officials 
uneasy. Publicizing these disagreements can be seen as unseemly and may 
invite or support further disputes and litigation. 
The only formal changes to E.O. 12,866 made by the Bush Administra-
tion came in E.O. 13,258, issued on February 26, 2002.79 The amendments 
remove the Vice President from the regulatory review process. This may 
partly reflect the fact that the current Vice President is already quite busy. 
But more important, it strengthens OIRA's hand in its relations with agen-
cies. While an unhappy agency, or private party, may still obtain relief 
from the White House when OIRA has upset it, that option is much more 
theoretical than real. Without the Vice President as a potential sympathetic 
ear and point of appeal, OIRA will more often be the last word . And the 
fact that OIRA knows this may encourage it to act somewhat more boldly. 
2. Federalism Executive Order 
More surprising than the inaction with regard to E.O. 12,866 has been 
the same inaction with regard to the federalism Executive Order, E.O. 13,132. 
Reportedly, a new federalism order (which would, among other things, 
have included language making it harder for agencies to preempt state law) 
was in the works but was derailed by September 11.80 In any event, as of 
this writing, the Bush Administration continues to operate under the Clinton 
federalism order. 
3. Small Business Executive Order 
On August 13, 2002, President Bush issued E.O. 13,272, "Proper Consid-
eration of Small Entities in Agency Rulemaking." The new Executive Order 
REV. 1489, 1524, 1549 (2002) (proposing that the E.O expressly provide: 
For each regulatory action that the Administrator of OIRA returns to an 
agency for further consideration of some or all of its provisions, the 
Administrator of OIRA shall provide the issuing agency a written ex-
planation for such return , setting forth the pertinent provision of this 
Executive Order on which OIRA is relying.). 
79. Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9385 (Feb. 26, 2002). 
80. See New Federalism Executive Order?, 27 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS I 8 (Winter 
2002). 
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seems essentially symbolic and political. Though trumpeted by the Small Busi-
ness Administration as a major substantive accomplishment,81 the order adds 
nothing substantively and little procedurally to existing requirements. In es-
sence it is a reminder to agencies of the existence of the Regulatory Flexibility 
Act. It does require agencies to which the Act applies to "establish procedures 
and policies to promote compliance with" the Act and to take account of the 
impact of proposed rules on small businesses, "as provided by the Act."82 The 
Small Business Administration's Chief Counsel for Advocacy (Advocacy) is 
periodically to notify agency heads of the Act's requirements and provide train-
ing on compliance with the Act.83 Advocacy also may comment on proposed 
rules,84 which, of course, he could do, and has done, without this order.85 In-
deed, in this respect the more important document is a March 2002 Memoran-
dum of Understanding between OIRA and the Office of Advocacy ensuring 
coordination, information sharing, and full consideration of impacts on small 
entities during the regulatory review process.86 
The order imposes no meaningful new responsibilities on covered agen-
cies. It does state that each agency must prepare written procedures and poli-
cies to ensure full consideration of the potential impact of new regulations on 
small businesses;87 this is not an explicit requirement of existing law. The 
order also requires agencies to notify Advocacy of any draft rule that may 
81 . See Press Release, Office of Advocacy, Small Business Administration , Presi-
dent Bush Signs Executive Order to Relieve Regulatory Burden on Small 
Business (Aug. 15, 2002) (quoting the Chief Counsel for Advocacy as say-
ing that the President had "promised to tear down the regulatory barriers to 
job creation for small business and give small business owners a voice in 
the complex and confusing federal regulatory process" and the E.O. "does 
just that"), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/press/02-34.html. 
82. Exectuive Oorder No. 13,272, § 1, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,461 (Aug. 16, 2002). 
83 . Id. §§ 2(a)-(b) . The office states that it plans to begin "intensive training" in 
fall 2002. Memorandum from Thomas M. Sullivan, Chief Counsel for Ad-
vocacy, SBA, to Heads of Federal Agencies (Aug. 22, 2002). 
84. Exectuive Oorder No. 13,272, supra note 82, at § 2(c). 
85 . Indeed, the office is under a statutory mandate to "represent the views and 
interests of small businesses before other Federal agencies whose policies 
and activities may affect small business." 15 U.S.C. § 634(c)(4) (2000). 
86. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Office of Advocacy, U.S . 
Small Business Administration and the Office of Information and Regula-
tory Affairs , Office of Management and Budget (Mar. 19, 2002), available 
at http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/law _mou02.pdf. 
87. Executive Order No. 13,272, supra note 82, at § 3(a). 
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have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, 
"[g]ive every appropriate consideration to any comments provided by Advo-
cacy regarding a draft rule," and respond to any such comments when issuing 
the final rule.88 These requirements simply reiterate (indeed, they are sketchier 
than) the preparation and distribution of regulatory flexibility analyses re-
quired by the RFA. The order also contains the standard provision precluding 
judicial review of (non)compliance therewith.89 
4. Prompt Letters 
The most striking and unforeseen development on this front has been 
OIRA's creation of the so-called "prompt letter"-a letter from OIRA to an 
agency suggesting that it ought to undertake a particular regulatory agency 
action. OIRA has written six of these, beginning in September 2001 : to OSHA, 
recommending that it promote or require greater use of automatic external 
defibrillators; to HHS, recommending that it focus on a languishing rulemaking 
that would require nutritional labels to include transfatty acids; to the EPA, 
recommending that it pay greater attention to the health risks of particulate 
matter; to DOT and the NHTSA, recommending that they consider a new 
automobile crash test for the frontal occupant protection standard so as to 
prevent injuries to the lower extremities; to the EPA, recommending im-
provements to the handling and dissemination of Toxic Release Inventory 
data; and to the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, asking it to 
consider a rulemaking to strengthen the corporate governance of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac and require them to make certain public disclosures.90 
The prompt letter is a remarkable initiative; OIRA has never before re-
lied on cost-benefit analysis to suggest and promote, rather than react to and 
obstruct, government regulation. As Robert Hahn and Cass Sunstein have 
written, "[u]ntil now, no institution in government has vindicated the hopes 
of those who believed that cost-benefit analysis could be used to help pro-
mote better priority-setting, block senseless rules, and spur agency action 
when it was justified."91 
88. Id. § 3(b), (c). 
89. Id. § 8. 
90. OIRA Prompt Letters, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/ 
prompt_letter.html. 
91. Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, Regulatory Oversight Takes Exciting 
New Tack, PoucY MATTERS No. 01-25 (Sept. 2001) (emphasis added). 
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In general , prompt letters have been enthusiastically received . However, 
some wariness has been expressed about their potential to increase OIRA's 
influence and control at the expense of agency autonomy. OIRA Administra-
tor John Graham has been careful to point out that the prompt letter is not a 
"directive" and has no legal force: "It is a public request designed to stimulate 
agency and public deliberation. Final decisions about priorities remain in the 
hands of the agencies."92 While this is technically true, obviously the letters 
will be, and are intended to be, influential in redirecting agency priorities. A 
cynic might suggest that they are anti-regulatory maneuvers. In this view, 
their importance lies in the opportunity costs they impose: if an agency pur-
sues the agenda suggested by OIRA, it will be forgoing other initiatives. 93 
The validity of this objection hinges on the validity of the underlying cost-
benefit analysis; if, really, OIRA is proposing regulatory undertakings that 
are particularly cost-effective, then the opportunity costs of pursuing them 
will by definition be less than those of alternative agency activities. 
Symbolically at least, the prompt letters are extremely important. Whether 
they will become a common vehicle for regulatory priority-setting remains 
to be seen. However, this may be the opening wedge of a new role for OIRA 
and a new understanding of the role of cost-benefit analysis . 
C. Electronic Rulemaking 
The increased use of the Internet in the rulemaking process years has 
been nothing short of extraordinary. The past year has seen a particular accel-
eration and expansion of e-rulemaking among federal agencies. To varying 
degrees, rulemaking dockets are available at agency Web sites. Often some or 
all submitted comments are themselves available, comments can be submit-
ted in electronic format, commenters can read and comment upon others' 
submissions, and interested persons can sign up for notification by listserv 
when an agency issues a notice of proposed rulemaking or a final rule, or 
even when a comment of interest is submitted.94 A recent survey found that 
92 . Graham Testimony, supra note 74, at 2. 
93 . See Ellen Nakashima, 0MB Asks Agencies for Action, WASH. PosT, Sept. 21, 
200 I, at A30 (noting the "mixed reactions" of watchdog groups and quot-
ing Wesley Warren of the Natural Resources Defense Council as saying that 
"if there is going to be the substitution of White House political judgment 
for the ongoing expertise of agencies, it could be harmful") . 
94. A thorough but already dated summary of e-rulemaking efforts is General 
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one in three users of government Web sites, some 23 million people, have 
used the Internet to send comments to officials on matters of public policy. 95 
As of January 2002, 58 percent of Internet users, or 68 million adults, had 
Accounting Office, Federal Rulemaking: Agencies' Use of Information 
Technology to Facilitate Public Participation (GAO/GGD-00-135R) (June 
30, 2000). 0MB Watch has produced a brief but more recent summary of e-
rulemaking systems at a dozen different agencies. 0MB Watch, Current E-
Rulemaking Systems (June 19, 2002), available at http://www.ombwatch.org/ 
article/articleprint/848/-1/4. The most complete, user-friendly, and impres-
sive e-rulemaking site has historically been that of the Department of 
Transportation, which is found at http://dms.dot.gov. The site's most recent 
improvement is a list server that will send the subscriber an automatic e-
mail notification when government documents meeting the subscriber's 
criteria are entered into the DOT's Docket Management System. 
The Office of the Federal Register recently established a useful portal 
through which to access the e-rulemaking sites of numerous federal govern-
ment agencies. See http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/public_ par-
ticipation/rulemaking_sites.html. The Office also maintains an online list 
of all proposed rules currently open for comment. See http://www.archives. 
gov/federal_register/public_participation/fr_e_docket.html. 
This transformation has occurred without specific statutory mandate or 
authority. The pending E-Government Act might change that. Two existing 
pieces of legislation are sometimes seen as authorizing or requiring some 
form of e-rulemaking, although that is not the usual understanding. First, 
the Electronic Freedom of Information Act (EFOIA) requires agencies to 
provide for electronic access to any record that has been released to any 
person and is "likely to become the subject of subsequent requests for 
substantially the same records." 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(2)(D), (E) (2000). That 
description arguably reaches rulemaking docket sheets, perhaps the actual 
docket contents, and certainly proposed and final rules. Second, the Gov-
ernment Paperwork Elimination Act (not to be confused with the Paper-
work Reduction Act) requires that by October 2003 executive agencies 
provide "for the option of the electronic maintenance, submission, or dis-
closure of information, when practicable as a substitute for paper." 44 U.S.C. 
§ 3504 (2000) (note). This provision could be read to apply to proposed 
and final rules and public comments thereon. However, implementation of 
the Act has focused on agency information collection covered by the PRA 
and similar reporting and dissemination efforts. 
95. PEW INTERNET &AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, THE RISE OF THEE-CITIZEN 8 (2002). Of 
course, not all or even a majority of these contacts occurred during section 
553 rulemakings. 
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visited at least one government Web site; less than two years earlier, the number 
was only 40 million.96 
Thus far, these developments have occurred agency by agency. While there 
is now a useful portal through which to access all federal government Web 
sites, www.firstgov.gov, there has been no real coordination among or oversight 
over the agencies. The Bush Administration is working to change that in ways 
that may have consequences for e-rulemaking. 
In July 2001, 0MB established an "E-GovernmentTask Force," headed by 
the newly created Associate Director for Information Technology and E-Gov-
ernment.97 In October, the President's Management Council (PMC) approved a 
set of recommendations from the task force, leading finally to the publication 
in February of 2002 of a document entitled "E-Government Strategy."98 In 
addition to a fair amount of rather abstract discussion of the benefits of and 
obstacles toe-government, the strategy document sets out 24 specific e-govern-
ment initiatives to be implemented in 2002 and 2003. 0MB and the PMC are 
expected to provide overall management oversight; each of the 24 initiatives 
also has a specific agency identified as the "managing partner." 
Many of these initiatives are focused on transactions between citizens or 
businesses and the government-paying taxes, filing forms, requesting ben-
efits, and so on. Others are about providing the public with information. But 
one of the 24 is "Online Rulemaking Management." The Department of Trans-
portation, which has consistently been at the front of the e-rulemaking pack, is 
the "managing partner" for the initiative. The plan is that existing e-docket 
96. Id. at 5. 
97 . See Memorandum from Mitchell E. Daniels, 0MB Director, for Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies (July 18, 2001). Daniels noted that 
electronic government was "one of the five key elements" of President 
Bush's Management Plan and "at the core of the President 's management 
agenda." Id. Having an Associate Director for Information Technology and 
E-Government is a step toward creation of a "centralized office to encour-
age and monitor best practices relating to agency Internet use," as urged by 
the ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice. See Sec-
tion of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, Twenty-First Century 
Governance: Improving the Federal Administrative Process, 52 ADMIN . L. 
REV. 1099, 1107 (2000). The pending E-Government Act would establish 
an Office of Electronic Government, headed by a Senate-approved Admin-
istrator, within 0MB. 
98. Office of Management and Budget, £-Government Strategy (Feb. 27, 2002), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/egovstrategy. pdf. 
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systems will "be expanded and enhanced to serve as a government-wide system 
for agency dockets"99 through establishment of a "unified cross-agency public 
comment site." 100 In theory, this would produce (a) better rules, because 
"[c]omments would be organized using knowledge management tools" and 
citizen and business participation would increase by 600 percent, (b) "a more 
collaborative and transparent atmosphere," and (c) significant cost savings.101 
The future of this initiative, and of e-rulemaking generally, is hard to 
predict. 102 Thus far, e-rulemaking represents a new and improved format for 
what is still recognizably the section 553 notice-and-comment process. The E-
Govemment Strategy anticipates a more fundamental transformation, but its 
scope is vague. If rulemaking is really to be remade by the Internet, one per-
haps unintended change might be a reduction in the power of individual agen-
cies. On the one hand, the mantra of centralization and coordination suggests 
less of a focus on individual agencies and potentially a greater role for 0MB, 
the White House, or other overarching institutions. On the other hand, the 
emphasis on increased participation and transparency-the empowerment of 
thousands of individuals in some form of virtual self-government-is a move 
away from the technocratic, Breyerian model of regulation by experts. In this 
way, the agency would lose authority on each side. 
D. Implementation of the Data Quality Act 
The Data Quality Act (DQA)I03-an innocuous-looking, brief, potential 
time bomb stuck into the 2001 Appropriations Act-requires 0MB to issue 
"Government-wide guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and maximiz-
ing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information (including 
99. Id. at 27. 
100. Id. at 14. 
101. Id. at 27. 
102. A useful catalogue of issues confronting the further implementation of e-
rulemaking is Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Future of E-Rulemaking: A Research 
Agenda, 27 ADMIN . & REG. L. NEWS 6 (Summer 2002). 
I 03 . Consolidated Appropriations Act of 200 I, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 
Stat. 2763, 2763Al54 (2000) (codified at 44 U.S.C.A. § 3516 Note) [herein-
after cited as Data Quality Act]. This Act is also discussed herein in Govern-
ment Information and Right to Privacy (supra 109-11 ), Regulatory Initiatives 
(supra 133-46), and Environmental and Natural Resources Regulation (in-
fra 332-34). 
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statistical information) disseminated by Federal agencies." 104 Agencies must 
then produce their own guidelines to achieve those information quality goals; 
the agencies must also establish a mechanism by which affected persons may 
seek and obtain correction of information disseminated by the agency. io5 0MB 
issued its information quality guidelines on September 28, 2001; the agencies 
duly proposed their guidelines;rn6 and the final agency guidelines were due on 
October 1, 2002. The Act's implications for agency activities generally and 
rulemaking in particular remain uncertain, but they could be enormous. 
Several unresolved issues concerning the interplay between the DQA and 
section 553 have surfaced in the process of developing agency guidelines. 
These include: 
Is the inclusion of material submitted by a commenter in a docket, 
paper or electronic, the "dissemination" of "information" by the 
agency and so covered by the Act? The EPA's draft guidelines, for 
example, say no, although if the agency later expressly relies on such 
information as support for a final rule, it would then be covered. 101 
If a person requests correction of information that appears in a rulemaking 
docket, must the agency respond to and, as appropriate, correct any misinfor-
mation through a mechanism, or on a timetable, separate from the rulemaking 
process? Or does the consideration of and response to comments under sec-
tion 553 qualify as the "mechanism" required by the DQA ?108 Many agencies 
have taken the position that the rulemaking process itself suffices; 0MB, 
among others, is less sure, expressing particular concern about the timeliness 
of any agency response and correction. 109 
I 04. Id. § 5 I 5(a). 
105. Id. § 515(b)(2)(A). The Act's reference to "agencies" is understood to mean 
those agencies subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act, which is pretty 
comprehensive. See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(1) (2000). 
I 06. The Section on Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice submitted 
comments to eight separate agencies on their proposed guidelines. 
I 07. EPA Draft Data Quality Guidelines, §§ 1.3, 1.4, 67 Fed. Reg. 21 ,234 (Apr. 
30, 2002). 
I 08. See Center for Progressive Regulation, Comments on EPA Draft Data Qual-
ity Guidelines (May 3 I , 2002), at I 1-12. 
I 09. See Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, U.S. 0MB, O/RA Review of 
Information Quality Guidelines Drafted by Agencies at 15-16, 32-35 (June 
10, 2002) (attachment to Memo from John D. Graham to the President's 
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Must an agency respond to a section 515 request for correction that could 
have been made during an official comment period but instead came later? 
The EPA's draft guidelines say that it will not respond in these circumstances. 
The ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulation took issue with this 
provision.Acknowledging that "it would be optimal to encourage rulemaking-
related correction requests to occur inside the ... comment period ... as part 
of comments on the rule," the Section nonetheless took the position that the 
close of the comment period should not bar a correction request. 
Under prevailing administrative law standards, agencies must make avail-
able outside studies on which they rely in promulgating a rule. However, they 
need not obtain, make available, or independently assess the underlying data 
contained in those studies. 110 A strong reading of the DQA would require the 
agency to assess the raw data underlying scientific studies before "dissemi-
nating" them so as to ensure the "quality" and "objectivity" of the studies. 
While the DQA applies only to dissemination, not to other uses of informa-
tion, general rulemaking principles require an agency to disseminate studies 
on which it relies. The combination might mean that a rulemaking agency 
could not rely on an outside study without undertaking the herculean, in-
deed impossible, task of obtaining, evaluating, and vouching for the data 
Management Council , June 10, 2002). OIRA has recommended that agency 
guidelines include the following unusually inelegant language: 
In cases where the agency disseminates a study, analysis, or other in-
formation prior to the final agency action or information product, re-
quests for correction will be considered prior to the final agency action 
or information product in those cases where the agency has determined 
that an earlier response would not unduly delay issuance of the agency 
action or information product and the complainant has shown a reason-
able likelihood of suffering actual harm from the agency's dissemina-
tion if the agency does not resolve the complaint prior to the final 
agency action or information product. 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, U.S. 0MB, Information 
Quality Guidelines-Principles and Model Language (Sept. 5, 2002) (at-
tachment to Memorandum from John Graham to the President's Manage-
ment Council (Sept. 5, 2002). 
110. This distinction was clarified in the recent D.C. Circuit decision upholding 
the EPA's revised National Ambient Air Quality Standards on remand from 
the Supreme Court. American Trucking Ass ' ns v. EPA, 283 F.2d 355, 372 
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (Tatel , J. , joined by Ginsburg & Williams, JJ. ). 
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underlying such a study. The 0MB Guidelines seem to stake out a middle 
ground on this issue. "Influential" analytic results contained in dissemi-
nated information must be "capable of being substantially reproduced," but 
this requirement does not apply to the original or supporting data, since 
those are not being disseminated. 111 
Just how the DQA will affect rulemaking is for now still uncertain. The 
answers await the final agency guidelines, and subsequent adjustments to and 
practice under them. 
111. See Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, U.S. 0MB, Guidelines for 
Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of 
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies §§ V.3(b), V.9, V.10. 
